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Do We Have an Imperial Congress?
JOHN NORTON MOORE*
ADDRESS
The doctrine of separation of powers is one of the foundation
principles of the great representative democracy that we have in the
United States. The drafters of our Constitution recognized that
power corrupts. They concluded that the powers of the federal gov-
ernment should be divided between the three branches so that one
branch would not have absolute power, and each would serve as a
check on the others. In our post-Watergate, post-Vietnam, post-
Church Committee atmosphere, the principle of separation of powers
has frequently been invoked as a check on the foreign policy actions
of the President. Scholars have talked about an "imperial" Presi-
dency and have urged Congress to undertake a more active involve-
ment in foreign affairs. Congress has responded affirmatively to the
urging and assumed a much more active role. Indeed, we have wit-
nessed an extraordinary period of expansion of Congress' role in the
formulation and conduct of United States foreign policy. In this set-
ting of congressional activism, I would like to ask a reverse question:
Do we have an "imperial" Congress?
This question raises the issue of congressional activism in foreign
affairs in a fairly direct fashion. The more academic question is what
checks does the separation of powers principle place on the Congress
as it carries out its role in foreign affairs? No one doubts that Con-
gress has an important role in foreign policy, but I think the more
critical issue today-and I hope you will forgive me if I do not dwell
on those areas where, in fact, there has been a significant and effective
role played by Congress in foreign policy-is to seriously examine
how the principle of separation of powers should operate to check
congressional activism in foreign policy.
I will discuss four points. First, I will examine, once again from
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Virginia School of Law, Director of the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, and Director of the
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Department of State, 1972-1973, and United States Ambassador to the Third United Nations
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a post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, post-Church Committee perspective,
the existing evidence of this increased congressional activism. Sec-
ond, I will examine the broad-in my opinion overly broad-philo-
sophical and theoretical underpinnings that form the basis for this
enhanced congressional activism in foreign policy. Third, I will
examine, very briefly, some of the ways in which this congressional
activism may have been harmful to the foreign policy interests of the
United States, particularly by undermining deterrence, or by failing to
add elements of deterrence to American foreign policy. And finally, I
will suggest a mechanism that I believe could be useful for establish-
ing a proper balance between the executive and legislative branches on
this fundamental issue of responsibility for the formulation and con-
duct of United States foreign policy.
First, let us turn to the evidence that reveals an explosion in con-
gressional activism in foreign policy over the last fifteen years. Sena-
tor Tower, in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, compiled a list of
some 150 different measures by which Congress has sought to place
checks on the executive branch's conduct of foreign affairs. Inciden-
tally, this is one of the characteristics of this congressional activism in
foreign affairs. It is not directed principally at deterring the foreign
enemies, or potential enemies, of the United States, nor is it directed
towards our relations with our allies. Rather, it is aimed primarily at
checking the executive branch in its conduct of foreign policy.
The scope of this legislative activity has been quite diverse. Fif-
teen years ago, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's compilation
of the statutes concerning important foreign relations of the United
States comprised a single volume.2 Today, four volumes are required
to list the same basic category of laws.3 Examined from the stand-
point of a national security lawyer, the impact of this congressional
activism is even more striking. For example, most of the law relating
to the intelligence area has been produced in the last fifteen years.
This is a rapidly growing and complex area of the law, with courses
on the topic now offered by law schools and bar organizations.
We have just completed an extraordinary public hearing by the
1. Tower, Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of
American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229, 238-46 (1981).
2. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATION ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES (Comm. Print 1973) (compilation of
public laws, executive orders, presidential documents, international treaties, and other
materials related to foreign relations).
3. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATION ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1987 VOL. I-IV (Comm. Print 1987) (compilation of foreign
relations material, including legislation, treaties, and related documents).
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Congress in which, as a form of congressional oversight, a failed cov-
ert operation was examined and critiqued.' We have also had an
enormous amount of congressional involvement in virtually every
area of arms control. For example, the Congress has attempted to tell
the executive branch what is the correct interpretation of an arms
control treaty of the United States.5 Furthermore, the State Depart-
ment authorization bill,6 which is making its way through Congress,
was innundated by a blizzard of amendments from all sides of the
political spectrum.
This congressional activism, however, has not been limited sim-
ply to legislative activity. Qver 100 members of the Congress have
joined in bringing a lawsuit that seeks to force the invocation of the
War Powers Resolution.7 In addition, we have an atmosphere in
which the Speaker of the House of Representatives, prior to the recent
Arias Peace Plan, sponsored a peace plan for Central America.' This
necessarily brief and impressionistic look at some examples of this
congressional activism indicates both the breadth of its reach and its
clear target.
Let us turn to the second and more important point: To what
extent are the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of this
4. H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
5. H.R. 1748, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). After delivery of these remarks, Congress
enacted the bill with the treaty defining provisions as the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, §§ 225, 226, 233, 101 Stat. 1019, 1056-
1057, 1061-1062 (1987).
6. H.R. 1777, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). After delivery of these remarks Congress
enacted the bill as the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub.
L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331 (1987).
7. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (Prudential considerations of
equitable discretion and political question doctrine required dismissal of petition by 110
members of Congress that sought declaration that United States military activities in Persian
Gulf required President to make 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) report.). See Crockett v. Reagan, 720
F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). In Crockett, 29 members of
Congress brought suit against the President alleging that (1) aid to the government of El
Salavador without an "exceptional circumstances" certification was in violation of Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2443, and (2) the presence of United States military
officials in an area of imminent hostilities without a 50" U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) report was in
violation of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548, and the war powers clause of
the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Id. at 1356. The dismissal of the suit was
upheld on the grounds that it presented a non-justiciable political question. Id. at 1356-57.
8. On August 5, 1987, Speaker of the House of Representatives Jim Wright drafted an
S11-paragraph "peace plan." Greenhouse, Latin Peace Plan is Put Forward by Administration,
N.Y. Times, August 5, 1987, at Al, col. 1. The central points of this proposal were as follows:
(1) an immediate cease-fire to be supervised by the Organization of American States,
(2) United States suspension of aid to the contras and suspension of Nicaraguan receipt of aid
from Cuba and the Soviet Union, (3) regional security discussions, and (4) lifting of the United
States trade embargo against Nicaragua. N.Y. Times, August 5, 1987, at AI0, col. 5-6. The
plan, however, fell apart.
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approach overly broad and constitutionally suspect? It seems to me
that there are a series of myths that influence our views. Two are
affirmative myths, and the third myth is one that we simply do not
think about, really a myth by omission from the overall discussion.
The first of these myths is the myth of superior congressional
wisdom in regard to Vietnam, a myth that has had so much to do
with this new congressional activism. We forget that prior to the
1968 Tet offensive, the Congress was a full party to the Vietnam
engagement. It voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, with only a total of two votes cast against the resolution
by both Houses.9 Ironically, that resolution met, in every way, the
requirements of the later War Powers Resolution.10 Within nineteen
months of the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and with
200,000 troops in Vietnam, Congress overwhelmingly rejected a
motion by one of those dissenting members to repeal it. 1 Within
another year, after a further increase in Vietnam troop strength, both
Houses of Congress voted overwhelmingly for a $12 billion supple-
mental appropriation that was earmarked specifically for operations
in Vietnam.' 2
The reality, therefore, is that Congress, as well as the media,
strongly supported American involvement in Vietnam until the 1968
Tet offensive. At that point, however, Congress, the media, and the
American people misperceived this televised battle as a military defeat
when, in purely military terms, it was, in fact, the opposite. It was
only after the Tet Offensive that Congress began decrying our involve-
ment in the war and began saying that it was Mr. Johnson's and Mr.
Nixon's war.
Just as Congress did not prevent us from getting into the Viet-
nam War, Congress did not take the United States out of the Vietnam
9. Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 1, title VI (1964
& Supp. V 1969)), terminated by Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2055 (1971) (codified at 50
U.S.C. App. § 1, title VI (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The House vote was 416-0. H.R.J. Res.
1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 18,555 (1964). The Senate then substituted
H.R.J. Res. 1145 for its own S.J. Res. 189 and passed the bill on a vote of 88-2. H.R.J. Res.
1145, 110 CONG. REC. 18,470-71 (1964). Senators Gruening and Morse were the only
legislators who opposed the resolution. 110 CONG. REC. 18,471 (1964).
10. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
11. Morse amendment to S. 2791, Supplemental Defense Appropriation Act of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-374, 80 Stat. 79 (1966). On March 1, 1966, Senator Wayne Morse (D. Ore.) offered
an amendment to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 112 CONG. REc. 4,370 (1966). The
motion was tabled on a vote of 92-5, with the yeas representing support for the Johnson
administration's Vietnam policy. 112 CONG. REC. 4,404 (1966).
12. Supplemental Defense Appropriation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-374, 80 Stat. 79
(1966).
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War. It was ended not by way of congressional action, but by the
Paris Peace Accords.13 At that point, Congress passed extraordina-
rily broad measures, including a resolution that effectively said, in
advance, to the North Vietnamese that under no circumstances would
the United States ever reenter the war in Vietnam. 4 These substan-
tially undercut the deterrence of future North Vietnamese aggression
in South Vietnam.
The issue I am raising is not whether we should, or should not,
have gone back into Vietnam. Rather, the issue is whether it was
wise, in terms of deterrence, to signal so clearly to the North
Vietnamese that under no circumstances would the United States
react to violations of the Accords, at the same time that we were
decreasing the levels of American military assistance to the RVN
Government. As a consequence of this post-Paris Peace Accords con-
gressional enactment, the North Vietnamese built up their mainline
tank units, massively strengthened their other mainline forces, and
crossed the Accord line with twenty-two of twenty-three of their
mainline units, 5 confident that there would be no U.S. response. It
seems to me that this is a record that does not show superior congres-
sional wisdom in regard to Vietnam.
The second myth is the myth of plenary congressional authority.
This myth has a series of sub-myths. One of these is that checks and
balances are applicable only to the President. We tend to think of
these principles only in terms of the necessity of checking executive
action. Checks and balances are not something that we generally
think about with respect to the activities of the Congress. As we
know from the history of the drafting of the Constitution, however,
that understanding is wrong. The drafters were at least as concerned
with the concept of an "imperial" Congress, as they were with the
concept of an "imperial" President, and they sought to devise a sys-
tem of checks and balances that effectively operated to prevent both. 16
A second sub-myth here, so to speak, is the "single barrel"-i.e.
13. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, January 27, 1973,
24 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 7542, 935 U.N.T.S. 2; Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Viet-Nam, January 27, 1973, United States-North Vietnam, 24 U.S.T. 115, T.I.A.S.
No. 7542, 935 U.N.T.S. 52. See also Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam, March
2, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 485, T.I.A.S. No. 7568, 935 U.N.T.S. 405 (establishing international
monitoring commission).
14. See Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 401, 85 Stat. 360 (1971) (sense of Congress that hostilities be
terminated in Indochina).
15. The Vietnam Debate: A Fresh Look at the Arguments (J.N. Moore ed.) (to be
published in 1989).
16. See remarks of Charles J. Cooper in Cooper, Hatch, Rostow & Koh, What the
Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165, 168-74 (1988).
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single question-approach which is the prevailing legal framework for
analysis in this area. This approach asks whether Congress has acted
in an area that involves an exclusively presidential power. Only if the
answer is yes, is it then concluded that Congress has exceeded its
powers. The appropriate framework, however, should be a "double
barrel" approach. Under this approach, the preliminary question
should be whether the Congress has the legislative power to act in the
particular area in which they seek to act. Then, the second question
should be whether the action infringes upon an area of exclusively
presidential authority, such as the commander-in-chief power. An
answer of no to the first question, or yes to the second, should pro-
hibit congressional action in the area.
Why this "double barrel" approach? It is appropriate because it
is rooted in the language of the Constitution. Article I, section 1 of
the Constitution gives Congress its legislative power and provides that
"[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States."' 7 Article 2, section 1, however, provides that
"[t]he Executive power shall be vested in the President of the United
States of America."'" The drafters drew the distinction between lim-
ited legislative powers and broad executive powers very deliberately,
intending that Congress would not have general plenary authority,
especially in the area of foreign affairs.' 9
This intent is apparent from the opinions voiced by the Founding
Fathers in interpreting the President's foreign affairs powers. Thomas
Jefferson wrote in 1790 that "the transaction of business with foreign
nations is Executive altogether. It belongs then to the head of that
department except to such portions of it as are specially submitted to
the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly."'20 A few years
later, Alexander Hamilton, as "Pacificus," wrote:
"It deserves to be remarked that as the participation of the Senate
in the making of treaties and the power of the legislature to declare
war are exceptions out of the general Executive power vested in the
President they are to be construed strictly and ought to be
extended no further than is essential to their execution." 21
In short, it seems to me that the starting point should be to first
17. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1 (emphasis added).
18. U.S. CoNsT. art II, § I (emphasis added).
19. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
20. Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments (April 24,
1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378-79 (J. Boyd ed. 1961) (emphasis
original).
21. Pacificus No. I, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 42 (H. Syrett ed.
1969) (originally published in Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia) June 29, 1793).
[Vol. 43:139
IMPERIAL CONGRESS
ask whether Congress, under an enumerated power, has the ability to
legislate in the particular foreign affairs area that is under considera-
tion, and if so, from where do they get the power. Further it must be
determined whether the power or ability of Congress to legislate
derives from a specific grant or from some reasonable penumbra of a
specific grant. The second question that must be asked, even if the
answer to the first question is yes, is whether Congress, in a particular
case, has interfered with an area exclusively under presidential
authority. An answer of no to the first question, or yes to the second,
should prohibit congressional activism in the area.
Another sub-myth that forms a part of this overall presumption
of congressional plenary power is the myth that all congressional
action can be legitimated either under the necessary and proper
clause, or under the appropriations power. A little thought on this
proposition, however, shows the intellectual bankruptcy of this argu-
ment. If, in fact, any congressional action in foreign affairs can be
legitimated by either the necessary and proper clause, or by the appro-
priations power, then, flatly, we have no principle of separation of
powers, and Congress has absolute plenary authority. Such a result
would be completely contrary to the framers intent and in direct con-
tradiction of well-established Supreme Court precedent. For exam-
ple, in Myers v. United States,2 2 the Supreme Court made the same
point that Jefferson and Hamilton had advanced, namely that article I
grants limited legislative authority to the Congress, while article II
confers a broad executive authority upon the President.
23
A series of attorney general opinions, 24 and the concept of
unconstitutional conditions, 25 refute the notion that the appropria-
tions power can be a valid basis for broad congressional claims of
22. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding unconstitutional a statute that restricted power of
President to remove first class postmasters).
23. Id. at 128, 137-39.
24. See, eg., Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory
Authorization, 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185 (1980); Legality of Certain Nonmilitary Actions
Against Iran, 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 223 (1980); Congressional Authority to Modify an
Executive Agreement Settling Claims Against Iran, 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 289 (1980);
Presidential Implementation of Emergency Powers Under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 146 (1979); Request of the Senate for an
Opinion as to the Powers of the President "in Emergency or State of War," 39 Op. Att'y Gen.
343 (1939); Questions Relating to the Administration of the Federal Register Act, 38 Op.
Att'y Gen. 276 (1935).
25. The "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine holds that the receipt of benefits may not
be conditioned upon the nonassertion of constitutional rights. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10-8, at 681-82 (1988). In the context of the Congress
and the President, therefore, the Congress cannot condition funding or authority for the
President to act in the foreign affairs arena upon the President's surrender of his own
constitutionally grounded duties and privileges.
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absolute plenary authority. For example, Congress cannot enact a
law that provides benefits, or draws other distinctions based solely
upon race, and then justify it as an exercise of the appropriation
power. It is equally clear that the appropriations power cannot be
invoked to legitimate a violation of a constitutional principle such as
the doctrine of separation of powers. In sum, Congress cannot violate
either the right to equal protection of the laws or the principle of sepa-
ration of powers and then justify it by the concept of "we have an
appropriations power," or "there is a necessary and proper clause."
Finally, we have the sub-myth that Congress, as the "demo-
cratic" branch, is the appropriate branch for dealing with foreign
affairs issues. In recent years with a capital "D," Congress has fre-
quently been "Democratic"-Democratic as opposed to Republican.
But with respect to its small "d" meaning in this myth, it is not sim-
ply a question of whether Congress should have the preeminent role
in dealing with foreign policy issues by virtue of its status as the
"democratic" branch. Of course it is a democratic branch. But this
argument ignores the fact that the executive branch is a democratic
branch as well. Moreover, the President is the only official elected by
all of the American people, and he is elected every four years. Cer-
tainly, this process with its built in accountability satisfies any, and
all, requirements that "democratic" ideals demand. Therefore, the
notion that the Congress is "democratic," and the President somehow
is not, is a groundless philosophical argument upon which to base this
increased congressional activism.
Mythology by omission is the third myth that underpins this
congressional activism. It is a failure to. ask how the framers per-
ceived the functional differences between the branches. The answer to
this question would tell us where each branch is likely to be most
effective, and what constraints there ought to be on each branch's
degree of activism. There are several very important reasons why,
generally speaking, the executive branch is given responsibility for
conducting the foreign affairs of the Nation. Principally, these
include the greater speed and decisiveness necessary for the conduct
of an effective and efficient foreign affairs policy, and which the execu-
tive alone can realistically exercise.26
26. The necessity for speed and decisiveness in the conduct of foreign affairs, and
consequently the need for the executive to exercise the predominant role in the foreign
relations of the Nation, was well recognized by the founding fathers. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 64, at 390-96 (J. Jay) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966). Jay succinctly summarized the
argument for conferring the preeminent foreign affairs role upon the President:
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that
perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases
[Vol. 43:139
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For example, after Congress passed the War Powers Resolution,
and after North Vietnam invaded the Republic of Vietnam, there was
a rapid collapse in South Vietnam. President Ford had to evacuate
approximately 6,000 Americans who remained there. In the begin-
ning of April, 1975, he took the extraordinary measure of inviting the
entire Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the White House to
discuss the situation .2  Addressing a joint session of Congress, the
President then asked for the authority to go in and rescue the Ameri-
cans, so that he would not run afoul of the War Powers Resolution, or
some of the other continuing Cooper-Church resolutions that
restricted United States reinvolvement in Southeast Asia.28
where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it
can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will
operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly
motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions who would rely on
the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and
still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention have done well,
therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties that although the
President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet
he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence
may suggest.
Id. at 392-93. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 449-54 (A. Hamilton) (G. Carey & W.
Kendall ed. 1966). Hamilton argued that the House of Representatives should not be involved
in the treatymaking process because "accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign poli-
tics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to
national character; decision, secrecy and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body
so variable and so numerous." Id. at 452.
27. R. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY
AND PRACTiCE 52-58 (1983).
28. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on United States Foreign
Policy (April 10, 1975), in 1975 PUB. PAPERS 459 (1977). In the address, President Ford
outlined South Vietnam and Cambodia's desperate situation, urged immediate aid for their
governments, and asked the Congress to clarify the restrictions on the use of United States
military forces to evacuate American citizens from areas of hostile activity. Id. at 462-65. The
President urged the Congress to complete action on his requests by April 19. Id. at 464. On
April 11, 1975, the President transmitted draft legislation to implement his requests, again
requesting immediate action. Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to Speaker of the House
Carl Albert and President Pro Tempore of the Senate James 0. Eastland (April 11, 1975), in
1975 PUB. PAPERS 474-75 (1977). That day, the Khmer Communist Forces ruptured the
defensive positions around the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, and the President ordered
United States armed forces to enter Phnom Penh and evacuate American citizens. Letter from
President Gerald R. Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President Pro Tempore of
the Senate James 0. Eastland (April 14, 1975), in 1975 PUB. PAPERS 476-77 (1977) (dated
April 12, 1975, released April 14, 1975). The President noted the provisions of the War
Powers Resolution, but explicitly declared that he had taken these actions pursuant to his
executive and commander-in-chief powers. Id. During the third week of April, 1975, the
situation in South Vietnam rapidly deteriorated and the President decided to begin
withdrawing American personnel from that country. On April 29, 1975, the President
announced that all remaining American personnel in South Vietnam had been evacuated.
Statement Following Evacuation of United States Personnel From the Republic of Vietnam
(April 29, 1975), in 1975 PUB. PAPERS 605 (1977).
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Congress immediately responded to his request. Under the expe-
dited procedures of the War Powers Resolution,29 the House and Sen-
ate each passed a bill that authorized the President to take the
necessary actions. 30  Because the bills were different, however, the
House and Senate went to conference and, unfortunately, were unable
to agree. 31 By that time, Saigon was being overrun, and the President
sent in military forces in a hasty operation to rescue the remaining
Americans and some of our allies. Ultimately, Congress was not able
to pass any legislation in this area, even after the rescue. In early
May, the House ended this debacle by decisively voting against the
conference report, thereby refusing to give the President any authority
to act at all under the War Powers Resolution. 32
What about greater secrecy? This is something that from time to
time is important in foreign policy. For example, does anyone seri-
ously believe that President Carter could have consulted with every
member of Congress with respect to the planning of the Iran hostage
rescue effort? The War Powers Resolution, however, does not permit
the President to consult with only two or three leaders of Congress.
The way it is written, he must consult with the entire Congress in
every possible instance.33 It seems to me that this is patently absurd.
The United States could not possibly mount a serious hostage rescue
effort if we had to bring that number of individuals into the process.
There is also the question of whether Congress is equipped to
effectively formulate a coordinated foreign policy, negotiating and
balancing the intricate mix of "carrots and sticks" that are necessary
for conducting our global foreign relations. I would argue that, for
the most part, the strength of Congress in foreign policy is to serve as
a mechanism to address broad policy, as an oversight mechanism and,
29. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, §§ 6-7, 87 Stat. 555, 557-58 (1973)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545-1646 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). In 1983 an
additional provision was added to govern the procedures of any bill introduced to force the
withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from areas of hostilities. Department of State
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 1013, 97 Stat. 1017,
1062-63 (1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1546a (Supp. 1 1983 & Supp. IV 1986)).
30. The House and Senate each passed H.R. 6096, but with different amendments. H.R.
6096, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 11,626 (1975).
31. The House disagreed with the Senate amendments, and the bill was sent to conference.
121 CONG. REc. 11,737-11,738 (1975). The conference report was subsequently accepted by
the Senate, S. REP. No. 97, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 11,970, 11,977 (1975), but
rejected by the House. H.R. REP. No. 176, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 12,752,
12,764 (1975).
32. The vote was 162-246. 121 CONG. REc. 12,763 (1975).
33. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, §§ 4-7 87 Stat. 555, 555-58 (1973)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543-1546 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (presidential
reporting and congressional action provisions).
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to some extent, as a blunt instrument of deterrence. Basically, this is
what Congress does best, legislatively, in foreign policy: It serves as a
fairly effective blunt instrument in a variety of foreign policy linkage
settings.
I would also argue that Congress can be overly responsive to
public opinion. We deliberately created a representative democracy
in the United States. President Kennedy, in his classic collection of
stories entitled Profiles in Courage,34 wrote of many situations where a
member of Congress, a Senator, or a member of the executive branch
opposed a proposal that was enthusiastically supported by his constit-
uents. If you look at the performance of Congress as a whole, how-
ever, I would argue that these situations are far outweighed by the
variety of instances in which Congress, especially in the foreign policy
arena, has been overly responsive to popular pressures.
Interestingly, one of those was the 1975 Mayaguez incident. At
the time, it was fairly clear that the Cooper-Church amendment was
still in effect.35 Nevertheless, the President acted decisively and his
action was very popular. Congress immediately praised the President
for his quick actions, a6 which was entirely proper under the circum-
stances. Now I think Cooper-Church was an unconstitutional limita-
tion on the President's powers, especially as it applied to that
situation. In any event, there was no suggestion of illegal presidential
action, as was claimed after President Nixon's actions,3 7 despite the
language of the Cooper-Church amendment which flatly stated that
American forces could not be sent into Cambodia.3 8
After the failure of the Iran hostage rescue effort, however, Presi-
dent Carter was beaten about the head and shoulders by the media
and public opinion. Congress did not lose any time in joining in the
34. J. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE (memorial ed. 1964).
35. Foreign Military Sales Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2053 (1971).
36. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REc. 14,451-14,453 (1975) (remarks by Reps. Fuqua, Stratton,
Flynt, Broomfield, Michel, Sikes, Edwards, Montgomery, Sisk in support of President Ford's
action).
37. Among the proposed articles of impeachment brought against President Nixon in the
1974 impeachment inquiry was one article that alleged that military activities conducted in
Cambodia from 1969-1973 were illegal. H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG.
REc. 29,279 (1974). The House Committee on the Judiciary ultimately decided to reject this
proposed article. H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 29,280 (1974).
38. H.R. 15628, as amended, Foreign Military Sales Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 7
84 Stat. 2053 (1971). The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report indicated that one of
the principle purposes of H.R. 15628 was to "prevent United States forces from becoming
involved in a war in behalf of Cambodia and to insure that United States forces now in
Cambodia are withdrawn." S. REP. No. 865, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. 1, 3 (1971), reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS 6054, 6054.
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criticism of the- President.39 Similarly, during the Grenada rescue
operation, many members of Congress were initially quite hostile.4
When the American medical students got off the plane and kissed the
ground on national television, however, and it became clear that the
public supported the operation, there was an immediate shift in the
mood of the Congress with respect to the Grenada operation. I know
because I was invited to participate in a hearing that was to be con-
vened in response to that action. The plan was to set up a hearing of
international lawyers, who, I assume, would have been critical of the
administration's action. I was invited, I suspect, as a token defender
of the administration's actions in Grenada. In any event, I got a call
almost immediately after the mood in the country had changed that
informed me that the hearings had been cancelled. Congress did me a
service in this case, however, because I took my planned remarks and
put them in book form.
The third point I wish to raise is that there is a critical difference
between the role that Congress played in the 1950's and 1960's, and
the role that it has been playing in the 1970's and 1980's, with respect
to deterrence. Deterrence is a fundamental component of American
foreign policy, if we wish to avoid war in the world. To be successful,
however, a policy of deterrence must be coherent and unified.
In the 1950's and 1960's, we had a series of congressional resolu-
tions that said Congress was joined with the President in putting for-
eign nations on notice that they better not attack a particular country,
or aggressively interfere with United States' defense commitments in a
particular area of the world.41 Since then, we have had a dramatic
reversal, and most of the congressional activism has been directed at
limiting the foreign policy actions of the President. I am not arguing
the merits of this activism in each and every instance. I am simply
saying that the difference in direction can have a profound effect on
39. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 9,274 (1980) (remarks by Rep. Dornan that President must
"level with us" on reason for hasty withdrawal); 126 CONG. REc. 9,274 (1980) (remarks by
Rep. Wylie that event "was one of the most bizarre and tragic in all of our history"). But see
126 CONG. REc. 9,275 (1980) (remarks by Rep. Biaggi commending President and arguing
that action was within law as a "mass rescue mission, something within his powers under the
War Powers Act").
40. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REC. H.8706 (daily ed. October 27, 1983) (remarks by Rep.
Dymally introducing resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of United States forces from
Grenada); 129 CONG. REC. E.5187 (remarks by Rep. Weiss introducing resolution calling for
immediate withdrawal of United States forces from Grenada).
41. See, e.g., S.J. REs. 28, S. REP. No. 13, H.J. REs. 159, H.R. REP. 4, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1955) (authorizing President to employ United States armed forces to protect security of
Formosa and related areas).
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deterrence, when we begin to signal to our adversaries in advance
where, and how, the President is prohibited from acting.
For example, in Angola, just when President Ford was having
some success in getting the Soviets to back down from pouring in
Cuban forces and supplies to the Marxist insurgents in Angola, the
Clark42 and the Tunney 3 amendments were passed. Immediately, the
airlift of military supplies from the Soviet Union to Angola was
resumed, and a large Cuban expeditionary force was put in place.
That force remains in place to this day.
Central America is another good example. The principal activity
of Congress in regard to this region has been to focus on United States
involvement and response. The Congress has been quick to place con-
ditions on United States assistance to El Salvador, and to limit the
kinds of support that Congress will provide for the Contras. Absent
from these actions, however, is anything that says to either Cuba, or
Nicaragua: "Stop your secret war against neighboring states. The
Congress of the United States is joined with the President in saying
that the continuation of that secret war, documented by our own con-
gressional committees, is inappropriate, and the United States will not
stand for it in the OAS [Organization of American States] region."
This is not a coherent policy that will act to deter further aggression.
In conclusion, allow me to suggest a proposal for arriving at a
better balance of the powers of the legislative and executive branches,
in regard to foreign affairs. Hopefully, this will result in a true bal-
ance, instead of the recent unilateral congressional determinations of
"balance" in the form of executive restrictive measures-measures
which often passed on overrides of the veto of the President.
42. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329,
§ 404, 90 Stat. 729, 757-58 (1976) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2293 (1982 & Supp. II
1984) (prohibiting assistance to any group for the purpose of conducting military or
paramilitary activity in Angola), continued by International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-533, § 118, 94 Stat. 3131, 3141 (1980), repealed by
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 811,
99 Stat. 190, 264 (1985). The original version of this act, S. 2662, was vetoed by President
Ford on May 7, 1976 because of provisions that the President believed would "seriously inhibit
my ability to implement a coherent and consistent foreign policy." 122 CONG. REC. 13,053
(1976). The President found the seven provisions providing for a congressional veto
particularly objectionable. 122 CONG. REC. 13,054 (1976). H.R. 13680 was then submitted as
a follow-up bill to S. 2662. 122 CONG. REC. 13,457 (1976). This bill had the veto provisions
reduced to two and, after bouncing back and forth between the chambers, was finally passed in
a form minimally acceptable to the President. 122 CONG. REC. 22,853 (1976). The legislative
history of this bill is discussed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1378-1454.
43. S. Amend. No. 75 to H.R. 9861, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), as enacted Department of
Defense Appropriation Act, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-212, Title IV, 90 Stat. 153, 165-66 (1976)
(prohibiting expenditure of procurement funds in Angola for other than intelligence gathering
purposes).
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The mechanisms that exist now have not been terribly successful.
Congress is simply writing into law its views on the separation of
powers. It is the Constitution, not the Congress, however, that deter-
mines where the powers of the branches begin and end. Congress
cannot, by its own enactment, change the lines drawn by the Consti-
tution that separate congressional and executive powers. Conse-
quently, if the War Powers Resolution changes the constitutional
allocation of powers between the branches one iota, then the War
Powers Resolution is unconstitutional, insofar as it seeks to alter our
constitutional scheme.
Yet another paradox is that in an era in which we quickly invoke
the rule of law to limit the commander-in-chief power of the Presi-
dent, Congress continues to invoke the War Powers Resolution as a
brake on presidential foreign affairs and military actions, despite the
fact that it is, at least in part, unconstitutional after Chadha." I do
not know of a serious argument that does not say Section 5(c) 45 of the
Resolution is invalid after Chadha, and probably Section 5(b)46 as
well. This does not even directly address the separation of powers
problems presented by the War Powers Resolution. The considera-
tion as to whether Congress is seeking to apply an unconstitutional
act is absent.
There is also a timing problem. When Congress simply enacts its
own views on the limits of presidential authority in foreign affairs, it
often does so in times of crisis, which is when the nation can least
afford it. The Congress may submit that it is acting to protect our
constitutional values or system. But the President, not just the Con-
gress, is sworn under the Constitution to protect the Constitution of
the United States. He also has the duty to protect the Nation against
our enemies. Consequently, in a foreign crisis, the President may be
forced into a Hobson's choice. He can choose to perform his constitu-
tional duties, thereby opposing Congress and creating an enormous
brouhaha with threats of impeachment, or he can accept these restric-
tions and witness an erosion of his own constitutional responsibilities
and powers. With either result, the Nation is the ultimate loser.
We could seek to have these issues addressed more actively in the
44. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding one
House of Congress legislative veto provision, § 244(c)(2) of Immigration and Naturalization
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), unconstitutional as violative of the bicameralism requirement, U.S.
Const. art. I, §§ 1, 7, and the presentment clauses, U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3).
45. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(c), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
46. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(b), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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courts. As a first step, I am in favor of encouraging the Supreme
Court to consider appropriate cases that present these issues. I am
hopeful that this will resolve the problem. Unfortunately, I do not
believe that this will provide the ultimate solution because there are
likely to be a series of case and controversy47 and political question
problems." Additionally, the Court would likely focus solely on the
legal issues, applying all of the restraint of the judicial system and not
permitting a broader resolution of the issue. In any event, it will be a
long, case-by-case process.
As an alternative proposal, I suggest that a bipartisan Presiden-
tial/Congressional Commission be established. This commission,
with half the members appointed by the President and half the mem-
bers appointed by the Congress-one quarter from each chamber-
would have a broad mandate to examine the issue of separation of
powers, in regard to foreign policy. It should make recommendations
as to how the current executive/legislative process could be enhanced
to formulate and conduct foreign policy more effectively. Such a
commission can realistically deal with both the legal and policy issues.
As an immediate counterargument, I realize that creating another
commission is a classic way to avoid the issue. I think, however, that
a commission approach is a practical and feasible approach.
The alternative is to leave it to Congress to draw these lines on its
own. This alternative, I believe, is doomed to failure, inherently
wrong in terms of the doctrine of separation of powers, and contrary
to the principle that no branch can be the sole judge of its own pow-
ers. Furthermore, it invites an eventual collision between the branches
that could result either in a constitutional crisis of serious proportions
or severe damage to the foreign policy of the Nation in a crisis setting,
at a time when we can least afford it.
47. For a discussion of the case and controversy problem, see C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 12, at 53-59 (4th ed. 1983). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 3-7, at 67-69 (1988).
48. For a discussion of the political question doctrine problem, see C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 14, at 74-81 (4th ed. 1983). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 3-13, at 96-107 (1988). As Lowry and Crockett indicate, the judicial branch is very
reluctant to become emmeshed in foreign policy squabbles between the legislative and
executive branches. Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 340-41; Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356-57. The
Lowry court stated, however, that
had the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution been squarely presented
'these prudential considerations would [not have been relevant.]'... The Court's
task then would have been to analyze the constitutional division of powers rather
than to evaluate the seriousness of military activity. The former is within the
purview of the judiciary.
676 F. Supp. at 340-41 (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000-01 (1979)).
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